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La réforme de la Chambre 
des communes 
The Unreformed Canadian House of Commons 
Robert J. JACKSON * 
Le Parlement évolue constamment et si l'on veut qu'il soit efficace, il faut 
que ses pratiques reflètent l'évolution de la société. L'auteur propose des 
changements dans le processus législatif la surveillance de l'exécutif, la 
représentation et l'organisation de la Chambre des communes car la société et 
l'appareil gouvernemental se développent plus rapidement que les mécanismes 
de cette chambre. 
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The task of reforming the federal House of Commons is unfinished. A 
balanced view, in my opinion, is that there has been remarkable progress in 
the past two decades but that there is still much to be done. The executive 
remains dominant, the institutions for parliamentary control weak and 
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Members as a whole too docile. The House needs to strengthen its role in 
policy-making and in surveillance of the government '. 
Reforming parliament is both a process and an end. It is never finished, 
but always proceeding toward the adaptation of institutions to their 
constantly changing environment. As the Special Committee on Standing 
Orders and Procedure argued in November 1982 : 
The reform of parliamentary procedure should be an ongoing process. 
Parliament is in a constant state of evolution, and if its practices are to be 
effective, they must be adapted when necessary to meet the changing needs of 
Parliament and reflect the changing conditions of society and the nation.2 
In the last ten years alone there have been several major reports from 
Standing and Special Committees on Standing Orders and Procedure, The 
Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, a Con-
servative Government Position Paper on Parliamentary Reform, as well as 
innumerable suggestions from the Canadian Bar Association, the Business 
Council on National Issues and practically every politician and commentator 
in the country. Members and critics will, and should, always demand 
changes in institutions and behaviour. This cannot be avoided. Gradually 
the reforms of one generation will be replaced by those of the next. The main 
issue today is that the reform process itself is in need of an overhaul. Too 
often reforms are piecemeal and contradictory. This problem can only be 
overcome by a general agreement by all concerned to focus on the goal of 
improving the effectiveness of parliament. In other words, diagnosis and 
prescription can only follow from a thorough knowledge of how the system 
works and an agreement on how it should work. There must also be an 
agreement on at least one goal — the House of Commons ought to be more 
important in the policy process than it has been in the past. 
In this paper I take it for granted that Canadians wish to retain a 
Parliamentary/Cabinet system of government and not adopt a thorough-
going Presidential/Congressional arrangement as in the United States. Many 
persuasive arguments for each system may be advanced, but I do not believe 
that we should adopt the ramshackle, « ungoverning» system of our 
1. A checklist of reform ideas around the world can be found in Ronald D. HEDLUND, 
•< Organizational Attributes of Legislatures», Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. IX, No. 1 
(February 1984), p. 51-121. For a justification in Canada see Robert J. JACKSON, « Models 
of Legislative Reform: Diagnosis and Prescription», Unpublished paper delivered at 
conference «Le Contrôle de l'Administration et la Réforme Parlementaire», Montréal, 
1984. 
2. House of Commons : Special Committee on Standing Orders and Procedures, Third Report, 
p. 5. 
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neighbors. Given this perspective, it should come as no surprise that I do not 
support many of the Utopian reforms which have been suggested for the 
House of Commons. One example would be that partisanship and party 
cohesion can be removed from Parliament. Some witnesses before reform 
committees have even suggested that more «free» (that is, non-party) votes 
should be allowed. This is sheer nonsense. In fact, MPs are « free» now to 
vote according to their wishes and consciences. The point is they don't 
choose to go against their parties. There are extremely few sanctions that can 
be used against them if they do. There are strong arguments too for retaining 
our cohesive party system. In reality, the United States Congress works 
along a four party system without discipline : (liberal Republicans and 
Democrats, conservative Republicans and Democrats). It disperses power so 
widely that it is not certain if anyone is in charge. Party groups coalesce and 
then disappear depending on the issue, regional concerns and pressure group 
activities. When there are no parties, group behaviour does not disappear. 
There will always be factions which members will follow in their choices of 
how to vote in the House of Commons. It is preferable to have them follow 
their own party's view rather than other groups with a narrower conception 
of the national interest, or as Lord Salisbury called them groups with a 
« paltry yelping shibboleth for a cry. » 3 
Fortunately, responsible Members of Parliament rarely support such 
Utopian proposals. Since the late 1960s they have produced constructive 
methods for improving the House without diluting the system of responsible 
cabinet government or destroying the cohesive party system. The most 
important innovations have come in the committee system, in televising the 
plenary session and in the organization of the House itself. 
1. The Permanent Committee System 
Committee reform has come in two waves. After 1968 the Trudeau 
government abolished the old system of examining budgetary estimates on 
the floor of the House and sent them instead to standing committees. These 
new permanent committees became multi-functional : that is, each committee 
examined the legislation, as well as the estimates, and conducted investi-
gations in their field of competence. Thus, the new system sharply reduced 
the financial discussions in plenary sessions and moved them to more 
3. For an extended discussion of party cohesion see Robert J. JACKSON and Michael 
ATKINSON, The Canadian Legislative System (Toronto : Gage, 1980), p. 199 ; and Robert J. 
JACKSON, Rebels and Whips (London : Macmillan, 1968). 
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specialized committees. In principle such committees should allow members 
to specialize and do a finer job in surveillance of the executive4. 
The second wave of committee reform came in the 1980 Parliament with 
the development of committee «task forces». The new special committees 
were to be pre-legislative organizations with very small memberships, 
enlarged budgets and current issues to discuss. Committees were set up on 
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements, Alternative Energy Supplies, 
North-South Relations, Employment Opportunities for the 1980s, The 
Disabled and Handicapped, Regulatory Reform, a National Trading Cor-
poration and somewhat later on Pensions. These committees performed 
well. They travelled more, heard more witnesses, and published more 
impressive findings than most of the permanent committees. 
2. Television 
Academic surveys have shown that the House of Commons is considered 
to be the most important institution in the country5, and yet these same 
studies indicate that large numbers of Canadians feel alienated from 
Parliament and consider they have no say in governing. However, the more 
highly educated and knowledgeable the individuals are the less they possess 
these attitudes6. In an effort to ameliorate this situation the House decided 
to broadcast its proceedings. In October 1977 the House began to transmit its 
plenary sessions to the country — an impressive first in the world. While 
there are some difficulties with the way television works in the House and the 
manner in which members have responded, the public access to Parliamentary 
proceedings was unquestionably improved by this technology7. 
3. Organization 
On May 31, 1982 a special committee on Standing Orders and Proce-
dure was set up to suggest further reforms for the House. While I shall 
4. For an overview of the procedural regime see John B. STEWART, The Canadian House of 
Commons (Montreal: McGill Queen's, 1977). For a behavioural analysis see Allan 
KORNBERG and William MISHLER, Influence in Parliament (Durham, N.C. : Duke University 
Press, 1977). 
5. Data from the 1979 Canadian National Election Study and the Quality of Life Study 1979, 
Phase II conducted by the Survey Research Institute for Behavioural Research, York 
University. 
6. Id. 
7. An excellent summary is provided in a series of articles in Parliamentary Government, vol. 3, 
No. 1. Included are discussions on the House on T.V., The Parliamentary Press Gallery, 
and is Parliament good television ? 
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discuss its other reports later, let me point out here that its third report was 
put into effect in the House in 1983, and again for 1984 on a provisional 
basis 8. The new procedures are a distinct improvement over the old system. 
The reforms limit speeches, predetermine the length of sessions, provide 
earlier sitting times, increase opportunities for backbench debate and to 
some extent improve the accountability of government. 
Finally, the House has an annual calendar and daily timetable. This 
change was warranted if only for the convenience of officials and MPs. 
However, meeting at regular periods also makes Parliament more accessible 
and understandable, and it removes the familiar ploy of threatening to 
extend the parliamentary session through the holidays to obtain the acquies-
cence of backbenchers to government policy. 
Reducing the length of speeches from 40 to 20 minutes and dispensing 
with the ludicrous Standing Order 43, which was a great time-waster, has 
been welcomed by all. Most members do not have 40 minutes worth of 
systematic thought to divulge, and even fewer wished to listen to 40 minutes 
of monologue. The additional ten minutes of comment and debate at the end 
of each speech has improved the life of Parliament ; exchanges have become 
more spontaneous and lively. 
The most dramatic reform may have been the one which forced the 
government to respond to committee reports within 120 days if requested. 
Another valuable change required the automatic referral of reports from 
Crown agencies and other government organizations directly to Standing 
Committees for their perusal. 
4. Unfinished Reform Agenda 
With the flurry of activity after the raucous bell ringing episodes, many 
reformers hoped Parliament would complete the reform process. It did not. 
Ideas to make the House more efficient and effective have been left in 
abeyance by the government. Even the gleeful Special Committee on reform 
which produced eleven unanimous reports came to no conclusions about 
how to get their proposals accepted or even how to prevent the bells from 
ringing in the future. 
Most of their reports, however, were well thought out and to some 
extent would redress the balance of power in Ottawa, a balance whose 
fulcrum has drifted too far away from Parliament Hill. Too much House 
8. House of Commons, Permanent and Provisional Standing Orders, 22 December 1982. 
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time is spent on a search for the dominant cliché which will impress the 
media. More concern should be given to making the House a workshop 
which is listened to by the executive. 
Let us summarize the changes that ought to be accomplished under the 
headings — law-making, surveillance of the executive, representation and 
organization. 
5. Law-Making 
Attempts to convert the House into the major policy-making arena are 
doomed to failure, but more parliamentary input into the system is possible 
and desirable without turning Canada into a Presidential/Congressional 
system. Backbench Members of Parliament can play a greater role at the 
pre-legislative stages of policy development. This process has already begun 
with the initiation of the new « task forces » organization for some commit-
tees. The concept is good and should be expanded. While most significant 
legislation has to be introduced by the government there is no reason why 
the inspiration cannot come from Members. As I pointed out many years 
ago, committees are most successful when « first, the committee behaves in a 
non-partisan manner and, second, the committee's contribution is timed to 
have the maximum effect on government policy.»9 The «task forces» have 
done precisely that. Concrete evidence is hard to establish, but the committee 
report on the Disabled and Handicapped stands out. As its authors boasted 
— « at the time this report is being tabled, there has been significant progress 
on 106 of the 142 recommendations which the Committee made in its two 
1981 reports. »10 Even Standing Committees have tried to emulate task force 
success in the 32nd Parliament. The committee on Indian and Northern 
Development, for example, clearly forced the government to act over treaty 
and land rights in Quebec ' '. 
Bills which the government introduced should generally be more 
understandable. To accomplish this an explanatory memorandum could be 
tabled with each bill. The paper would describe the reasons for the 
legislation, its relation to other laws, the expected results and the anticipated 
regulations. 
9. JACKSON and ATKINSON, supra, note 3, p. 148. 
10. House of Commons, Progress Report on Special Committee on the Disabled and Handicapped, 
p. 4. 
11. Karen ALLEN, «An Effective Committee of the House of Commons — The Standing 
Committee on Indian and Northern Development», Essay for Political Science 406, 
Carleton University, 1983. 
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The government should also discipline itself in the organization and 
production of the legislation timetable. A list of bills should be tabled at the 
time of the Speech from the Throne. And, the government's success should 
to some extent be determined by the passage of these proposals. As well, the 
government should provide parliament with a list of its activities a month at 
a time rather than the present weekly notices. The present planning process 
is simply too short. 
Subordinate legislation is another major problem. In principle the 
government should table the regulations to legislation along with the bills. 
The number of orders-in-council is growing by leaps and bounds. In 1982, 
4 379 orders were passed by the government under statute or prerogatory 
authority 12. 
There is a need for a new Statutory Instruments Act. The Standing Joint 
Committee currently complains that the government restricts its scope by 
construing its mandate too narrowly and by denying access to administrative 
manuals. Another worthwhile proposal would be for each Standing Com-
mittee to review the merits of regulations. In practical terms this would mean 
that the Statutory Instruments Committee would continue its survey of the 
legality and propriety of subordinate legislation while also being responsible 
to warn subject-matter committees about the need for further investigations 
on grounds of policy. 
Some technical bills, in particular tax legislation, could go directly to 
committees after First, and before Second, Reading. This would allow 
experts to be heard on legislation before the parties have to take sides on the 
basis of principle. Some non-controversial legislation could actually be 
heard in Second Reading Committees. In other words, there does not need to 
be one process for all types of legislation. More flexibility in the procedures 
would both streamline the process and allow greater MP and party criticism 
of the government at the appropriate stages of bill examination 13. 
6. Surveillance of the Executive 
The importance of democratic accountability lies in the need for citizens 
to be protected from arbitrary government action. This role is performed 
during elections by all citizens and politicians. Although such a function 
includes opposition tactics, embarassing the government, motions, Question 
Periods, etc., parliamentary institutions are also important in overseeing 
12. Private correspondence from the Privy Council Office, January 1984. 
13. JACKSON and ATKINSON, supra, note 3, Chapter 9. 
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finances and legislation. In fact, it is precisely in these fields that the House 
seems the weakest and requires the greatest reform today. 
The appointment of the new special task forces improved surveillance to 
some extent. A critical approach was illustrated by the criticisms of the 
committee on Disabled and Handicapped which reported that « The Members 
can find little reason for this situation (Canada's poor progress in helping the 
disabled) other than lack of direction and coordination on the part of 
government, institutional, and community leaders who have the power to 
make changes.»14 By increasing their knowledge and awareness of govern-
ment programmes, MPs are better able to perform watchdog activity on the 
government. 
However, it is in the financial field that new institutional reforms are 
needed most. Both the Lambert Royal Commission on Financial Manage-
ment and Accountability and the Special Committee made important 
recommendations in this area '5. As Ron Huntington and Claude-André 
Lachance pointed out in their paper, Parliament approves government 
expenditures at a rate of more than 150 million dollars an hour. And yet, 
taxation and the estimates of government expenditures are divided in such a 
way that the House cannot come to grips with their interrelationships. The 
committees are not even structured so that cross-departmental comparisons 
can be made. Each committee is compartmentalized and no committee has 
the capacity to analyze overall government revenues and expenditures in 
order to determine if reductions or increases in expenditure are warranted. 
The Lambert Royal Commission's recommendation that Parliament 
should be presented with five year expenditure forecasts was adopted, but 
not the accompanying proposal for a national Finance committee. Yet, 
precisely such a committee is needed in order that government revenues and 
expenditures can be considered simultaneously. Even the existence of such a 
committee will not completely remove all the hesitation of Members to 
reduce government proposals for expenditure. 
The problem is as much attitudinal as organizational. When members 
do serve on committees studying the estimates they have not been known to 
attempt to reduce government costs. They are usually concerned about the 
expenditures which will take place in their own constituencies and they 
14. House of Commons, Obstacles: Report on Special Committee on Disabled and Handicapped, 
p. 6. 
15. Canada, Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, Final Report 
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1979) and Douglas HARTLE, «The Report of the Royal 
Commission on Financial Management and Accountability», Canadian Public Policy, V, 
(Summer 1979), p. 377-378. 
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almost always want them increased '6. Members must come to the realization 
that the estimates are important not because of any specific impact on their 
constituencies but because of the overall effect of the expenditures on the 
national economy. By 1980 the eleven Canadian governments consumed 
4 3 % of the GNE and this figure is likely to continue to grow slowly 
throughout this decade l7. With figures of this magnitude it is imperative that 
methods of scrutinizing expenditures and their relationship to revenues be 
improved. 
The concept of ministerial accountability has also been the subject of 
much discussion in recent years. However, most of the specific reform 
proposals have been aimed at making Deputy Ministers more accountable. 
The Lambert Commission, for example, wanted to make them accountable 
for the legality, efficiency and even the effectiveness of programmes. In my 
opinion, this would not be a viable move. As Paul Thomas pointed out, 
« There are real difficulties in delineating in practice where ministerial 
responsibility ends and deputy ministerial responsibility begins. »18 Ambiguity 
is unavoidable. The final deliberation and responsibility must theoretically 
belong with the minister or the whole concept of accountability will be 
eroded. Consequently, this proposal should be shelved indefinitely ; the 
ultimate accountability must be retained by the ministers and not shared 
with their deputies. 
7. Representation Role 
One of the most important roles for legislatures in western democracies 
is to represent constituency and national interests. This paper does not 
discuss reforms external to the House which could be instrumental in 
carrying out this function. Suffice it to say that reform of the electoral and 
party systems would dramatically effect the type of parliamentary representa-
tion, but internal reforms of the House are also significant. 
The new special task force committees give the House another forum 
where the Canadian population can effectively be represented. Members of 
these task forces represented different geographical regions and the media 
paid much more attention to their deliberations and conclusions than to the 
reports of Standing Committees. Most of the task forces also produced 
16. JACKSON and ATKINSON, supra, note 3, Chapter 5,passim. 
17. Robert J. JACKSON, « An Underdeveloped Art : Analyzing Interest Groups and Lobbying in 
Canada», Unpublished paper presented at Johns Hopkins University, 1983. 
18. Paul THOMAS, «Practicable Reforms for Parliament», Options, vol. 4, No. 1 (January-
February 1983), p. 18-22. 
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glossy and expensive reports ; that of the task force on the Disabled and 
Handicapped appeared in a glossy format and had over 200 photo-
graphs. One member on the Alternative Energy committee put it this way ; 
« We agreed that we needed an attractive package that would encourage 
people to open it and read it and eventually reach an understanding of at 
least the major parts of it. » " 
The task forces travelled throughout Canada providing direct contact 
with the public. The figures are astonishing ; in one year seven of them held 
728 meetings (more than all 20 Standing Committees put together). Almost 
3 000 witnesses and 796 interest groups were heard. There is little doubt that 
the new system has taken « Parliament to the people». 
On the whole, members of these committees feel positive about their 
contribution. Backbenchers are convinced that the committees represent a 
new forum for parliamentary activities and want them incorporated into the 
regular organization of the House. 
Of course, there are also negative aspects about these new committees. 
They disappear after a final report. They are appointed for a task on which 
partisanship has not been expressed and they tend to be appointed to 
examine subjects with a high motherhood content. But, on the whole, the 
appearance of these new institutions has been a giant step forward. 
Unfortunately, the government is still quite wary of them. The reports, travel 
and staff are very expensive ; the average committee has cost over a million 
dollars. As well, the new organizations weaken partisanship, helping to 
break down party lines. From the government's point of view this may be 
undesirable. From a reformist perspective, it is excellent. It is a valuable 
device for backbench input into the system and Members must not allow it 
to atrophy. 
One of the fields about which the government has been most lax has 
been lobbying. As governments consume more and more of the GNP, 
lobbying or public relations has grown on the Hill and around Ottawa. In 
fact, it may be Canada's leading growth area. In a recent survey 75% of 
Chief Executive Officers said they had « frequent » contact with MPs20 . The 
subject is a complicated one, but the so-called Coalgate affair clearly 
19. Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, « Task Forces : A Model for 
the Future?», Parliamentary Government, vol. 2, No. 3, (Summer 1981), p. 6. 
20. Cited in JACKSON, « Lobbying in Canada», supra, note 17. For an extended discussion see 
Robert J. JACKSON, Doreen JACKSON and Nick BAXTER-MOORE, Politics in Canada: 
Culture, Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, forthcoming), 
Chapter 12. 
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indicated that the government's conflict of interest guidelines for ministers, 
public servants and those who work in Crown Agencies are inadequate. A 
Commissioner of Ethics and a more thoughtful set of rules for all public 
servants is needed. The registration of lobbyists would provide information 
for future improvements in the system. In this regard the late Walter Baker's 
bill C255 should be revived. Lobbyists — a rose by any other name — need 
to be brought out into the open where they can be observed and held 
accountable for their actions. 
8. Organization and Time Management 
In the past two years the House of Commons has improved its calendar, 
daily timetable and many other similar management areas. It has not, 
however, taken on some major issues such as those concerning the Speaker-
ship and closure or time allocation rules. 
Presently, the Speaker is nominated by the government and the 
appointment legitimated by the House of Commons. It is this procedure 
which justifiably allows the opposition to question the Speaker's impartiality. 
Several reforms are possible to improve this situation. For years some 
reformers believed there should be a permanent Speaker — chosen by 
parliamentarians, not necessarily from the ranks of MPs. Currently, most 
reformers favour having the House elect the Speaker by secret ballot. This 
method, which would be similar to that used to elect the Pope, would 
minimize party discipline in making the appointment and legitimize the 
impartiality of the Speaker's role. 
The election of an impartial Speaker would ensure that the House could 
do more of its work efficiently without the ever present charge of government 
bias. The bell ringing episodes during the first session of the 32nd Parliament 
were proof that new rules are required for much of parliamentary business. 
One statistical indication of the difficulties is that fully one-third of all 
parliamentary time during that long session was spent on procedural 
matters. (The recent sad display of obstructionism to prevent the language 
bill from passing in Manitoba is a current example of the same difficulty in 
the archaic rules). While one may debate the merits of omnibus bills such as 
the recent Liberal Energy package, there can be little compromise with the 
rule that majorities must be allowed to govern after a full hearing of the 
viewpoints of the opposition and public. A more impartial Speaker ought to 
be able to insist that votes in the House are held on a timely basis. If the 
opposition whips do not show up to vote, a time allocation motion should be 
placed on debating time and a vote held regardless of the whips' attendance. 
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A further minor, but possibly dramatic, change in in-House management 
could be achieved in the Internal Economy Committee. This Committee, 
which currently consists of only the Speaker and cabinet ministers, could be 
democratically reformed by the addition of several backbenchers2'. 
Further reforms would also be helpful in the standing committee 
system. Membership turnover continues to be too rapid to allow the 
development of expertise in committees. Committees continue to be manned 
by a small core of activists ; in one recent classic case half the attendance of 
all the committee meetings for one session was accomplished by only 42 
MPs. In this area new technical changes to the system have had only minor 
effect. 
Committee chairmen in Ottawa are too weak and do not command 
enough respect in Parliament. If they received the same pay as Parliamentary 
Secretaries they would not constantly wish to change positions, as is now the 
case. The recent reforms in the Quebec National Assembly put that 
legislature ahead of Ottawa in this respect. The Chairmen of Committees are 
now paid an increased salary and three of them are selected from the 
opposition22. Moreover, the impressive results from the « task force » special 
committees illustrate the need for more professional staff to be assigned to 
both MPs and the permanent committee system. If MPs are given adequate 
resources their influence in executive-legislative relations will increase. 
9. The Future 
Recent reforms have made the House a better functioning organization. 
The salary, conditions and staff for MPs have been improved dramatically, 
raising morale and efficiency. New techniques for improving the representa-
tion function, surveillance of the executive and law-making have also been 
introduced. But more improvements are necessary. Society and the govern-
ment apparatus itself continue to develop and change more rapidly than 
House mechanisms. Parliament must not continually lag in organizational 
innovation. Improvements such as I have suggested here, particularly in the 
areas of law-making and improved mechanisms for financial surveillance of 
the executive, can be introduced throughout the antiquated system to ensure 
that Parliament is in the foreground of political decision-making. For this to 
21. See Denis VAUGEOIS, The National Assembly in Evolution, (Quebec 1982), passim. 
22. L'Assemblée nationale, Les Règles de Procédure (Québec, 1984). The July 1979 British 
Rules which allow Select Committees to carry out investigations without requiring a 
reference from the House would be another excellent procedure for the Canadian 
Committees to adopt. 
R. J. JACKSON Chambres des communes 173 
happen, Members of Parliament themselves must desire change. What is 
most worrisome about present attitudes throughout liberal democracies 
generally, is that although Members of Parliament have the power to change 
their behaviour and the structures around themselves they do not choose to 
do so. The Italian author of the Leopard had the right maxim for them, « If 
things are going to stay the same around here — there are going to have to be 
some changes made. » 
Organization is important. It affects Members' choice of activities and 
to an unmeasurable degree also influences public policy. The House of 
Commons must therefore be strengthened by equipping it with the proper 
procedures, staff and resources. Only when the above-listed reforms are 
made to bring the power of the legislature more in line with that of the 
cabinet and the public service will it be an autonomous and vigorous 
institution. 
